The problem of 'humans and work' in a model working group is investigated by means of the cellular automata technique. The attitude of members of a group towards work is measured by an indicator of loyalty to the group (the number of agents who carry out their tasks) and lack of loyalty (the number of agents who give their tasks to other agents). Initially, all agents realize scheduled tasks one by one. Agents with the number of scheduled tasks larger than a given threshold change their strategy to an unloyal one and begin to avoid completing tasks by passing them to their colleagues. Optionally, in some conditions, we allow agents to return to the loyal state; hence the rule is hysteretic. Results are presented on an influence of (i) the density of tasks, (ii) the threshold number of tasks assigned to the agent, forcing him/her to change strategy on the system efficiency. We show that a 'black' scenario of the system stacking in a 'jammed phase' (with all agents preferring the unloyal strategy and having plenty of tasks scheduled for realization) may be avoided when return to loyalty is allowed and either (i) the number of agents chosen for task realization, (ii) the number of assigned tasks, (iii) the threshold value of assigned tasks that forces the agent to conversion from a loyal strategy to an unloyal one, or (iv) the threshold value of tasks assigned to an unloyal agent that forces him/her to task redistribution among his/her neighbors, are smartly chosen.
Introduction
In modeling social phenomena, the most important obstacle is the complexity of the human mind. Individual decisions depend not only on the present status of the environment, but also on the whole history of a given person. For a descriptive theory of individual decisions, see Bicchieri. 1 A predictive theory needs causal relations, what undermines the free will of human beings. Yet, from the point of view of a modeler, the eternal discussion of free will is somewhat vain: even in a fully deterministic world, to identify the boundary between 'yes' and 'no' in a complex multidimensional space of arguments, constructed in our memory, is a hopeless task. (For a recent and provocative formulation of the problem of free will, see Pereboom. 2 ) When collective effects are concerned, social modelers pin their hopes on the law of large numbers, where an individual can be reduced to a black box. How deep reduction is legitimized, depends heavily on the modeler's purpose; social libraries are filled up with selfdefending proclamations. For an outstandingly realistic approach, we can refer to the writings of Bruce Edmonds. 3 Also, a set of articles from Edmonds and Meyer 4 can be recommended. Our position here is that it is worthwhile to try to imagine the consequences of our memory for collective effects, even if no grounded scientific strategy justifies a concomitant set of assumptions. Once again, to keep the task simple, at least computationally, cellular automata (CA) are invaluable.
In CA, memory can be introduced directly by an enrichment of the rule, as was done in the construction of a reversible automaton. 5 There, the cell state at time t depends not only on the environment state at time t À 1 but also on the state at time t À 2. Another approach is to make the rule dependent on the mean state variable, calculated over the whole system history. 6 Here we prefer to switch to a new rule, when a given condition is fulfilled by the cell state. In this way the system refers to its memory in a dynamical way, which cannot be predicted before the simulation is performed; these characteristics of the problem are known as the computational irreducibility. 7 Further, the system can be switched back to the previous rule if another condition is met. This kind of hysteretic rule has been applied in man-machine systems, where different sets of rules have been switched on by different procedures. 8, 9 Here we apply it when referring to the human ability to modify the cognitive context as to enable decisions. 10 It remains in general accordance with the psychological concept of scripts, 1 which is activated once; the further behavior of an individual is executed according to this script.
Many works appearing in the past decade have shown the usefulness of CA in the field of modeling various aspects of an organization's management systems. Human (group of people) and work (workflow) are the key elements of the management system, thus, the analysis of these elements and their relationships is a major subject of research in this area. Robbins et al. 11 formulate the three 'paths of research' in business management. They are: workflow optimization (work), human group behavior (human), and human-things interaction (human and work).
The study of group behavior using a model based on CA is fairly common because it is a tool tailored to the nature and dynamics of social processes. A broad discussion of this subject was submitted inter alia by Hegselmann and Flache. 12 What provides the universality of CA are emerging attempts to build models within the two other perspectives of research in the field of management. For example, Hassan and Tucker 13 have demonstrated the use of CA to optimize locations of objects (facility layout problem). Optimization of rearranging, for example, machine in the production floor, leads to minimization of transport costs (time), and thus it is a typical task in the field of workflow optimization. Thirumaran et al. 14 proposed a simulation model which allows us to support the analysis of changes in the business processes of a customer service web portal. In both approaches, the individual agents (CA cells) represent the technical facilities and business rules and do not have a direct relationship with employees.
In this work we are interested in the prospect of 'human and work' research. In this area, our main goal is to build CA models that are tools which allow us to explain the global behavior of the analyzed system based on local interactions within groups of employees, and between employees and broadly understood environment. Agents in such models represent the people (employees) and the parameters (attributes). The CA rules represent procedures, which shall be adopted on the basis of more or less simplified assumptions and/or socio-psychological theories and knowledge of organization and management theory.
The theoretical model in this perspective was proposed by Bin and Zhang. 15 This model allows analysis of the impact of managerial decisions on the behavior of members of a group towards work, measured by a specific indicator of loyalty to the group (in accordance with the general sociological message that a group loyal to each other is effective in achieving the objectives). The authors assume, in accordance with the theory of 'social exchange', that people are motivated by a desire for social status and respect as much as they are motivated by gains that are material and/or monetary. They introduce, by splitting the group members into 'economic beings' and 'social beings', the possibility of analyzing management policy, which consists of incentives of economic and/or social nature. The direction of movement depends on the assumed policy and the type of agent (a social agent is attracted by social incentives, and economic agent by material ones). The simulation finishes with a state of equilibrium, and the evaluation of the applied policy consists of determining indicator loyalty value for a group for this state.
Another, more complex, approach is presented in the work of Shengping and Bin. 16 The proposed model takes into account the types of work performed by a group of employees. The authors introduced the characteristics of the tasks on a scale from 'hard' to 'soft' work. Hard work must be completed chiefly with technical ability, and soft work must be done with social communication ability. Employees were also categorized into groups on a continuous scale between 'working hard' and 'social'. An interaction between neighboring agents consisting of 'reconciling' each cooperates (on the scale between 'working hard' and 'social') with ambient agents (on the principle of the adoption pattern of majority) has also been introduced. Simulated at each step, the overall 'state behavior' of the group is therefore a function of many factors, including his/her behavior in last time step, his/her neighbors' behavior, his/her properties, characteristic and state of the work. Although the precise interpretation of such a complex indicator is difficult, in general, the level of 'state behavior' reflects the (average) degree of positive attitude towards work and in a broad sense can be associated with the level of loyalty, which was proposed by Bin and Zhang. 15 Management policy analysis in the perspective of the work initiated by Bin and Zhang 15 provides a model for the proposed work of Saravakos and Sirakoulis. 17 The authors, in a simple implementation of CA technique, have proposed the characteristics of workers' behavior on a seven-point scale from extremely negative to absolutely positive. As the second dimension of agent features indicator depicting each employee's insistence, his/her ability to remain 'uninfluenced' by his/her coworkers was adopted. Insistence takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes an employee who is highly influenced by his neighborhood and thus his behavior is determined by his coworkers; 5 is the total resistance to the influence of neighbors. For intermediate sizes weights of impact were adopted. The introduced behavioral rules allow us to simulate (in each step) attitude change of each agent according to its attitude in the previous step, and the characteristics of its neighbors. In addition, in the model it was assumed that insistence is an adaptable trait and it depends on the extent the employee conforms to the organizational norms. Organizational norms are determined by the company policy. The organization's policy is represented by the 'reward' coefficient (for positive behavior for agents with low insistence) and 'punishment' coefficient (for negative behaviors and a large insistence). Overall assessment of the behavior of group in a given environment is the average 'loyalty factor'. The main use of the model is to analyze the behavior of the tested group of workers (mainly by a loyalty factor) in the conditions of use of different combinations of reward and punishment levels.
The general idea of the analysis of key factors and relationships in the term 'human and work' and the ability to simulate specific managerial decisions is also used in the proposed model in this article. Loyalty is measured by the number of loyal agents, who carry out their tasks, and lack of loyalty is expressed by the number of unloyal agents, who give their tasks to other agents.
The latter activity is a channel of interaction between neighbors, which enables collective states. The current strategy of a worker depends on the actual number of his/ her awaiting tasks, which makes the changes dynamical and presumably complex. Shifted tasks make the neighboring workers overburdened, which enhances the probability that they will also shift their tasks; this positive feedback allows to expect sharp transitions between collective states.
A related problem in real life is the phenomenon of work stress-induced burnout, which can lead to a selfish strategy to shifting duties to colleagues. The problem is related to a number of professional groups, such as nurses 18 and police officers. 19 The unloyal state takes the form of absenteeism and/or passivity. Basically, the transition to this state is irreversible; therefore the return to the loyal state, considered below, could be interpreted as the staff turnover.
At the group level, the opposition between the loyal and the unloyal phase is an example of a social dilemma, as defined by Kerr and Park: 20 a dichotomous choice of strategy, and the choice which is individually profitable but worse when universally adopted. The concept of social dilemma is a generalization of the famous prisoner's dilemma, and it is used to discuss it in the framework of game theory; for a simple introduction we recommend Straffin. 21 Our assumption here is that the transition of an individual from the loyal to the unloyal phase is triggered by the large number of tasks. However, unloyal behavior can be seen also as a reasonable strategy of self-preference, when the number of tasks exceeds some threshold. Thus, the framework of game theory enables yet another interpretation of the transition from the unloyal back to the loyal state.
In the next section we define the CA, and we present the main results in Section 4 (including model verification in Section 3) obtained by means of computer simulations. Section 5 is devoted to the discussion of the results and conclusions.
Model
The model working group contains L 3 L agents occupying nodes of a square lattice. Each agent may follow one of two strategies (loyal or unloyal to the group). In the latter case an agent distributes his/her tasks among his/her nearest neighbors. The loyal agents do not bother their neighbors with their own task, and during each time step they complete one of their tasks. We start our simulations with a group of loyal agents without any tasks assigned to them. Agents loyal to the group but having more than some threshold number of scheduled tasks change his/her strategy to an unloyal one. Unloyal agents having assigned more than an assumed threshold number of task shift part of their task to their adjacent neighbors. These neighbors unconditionally take these additional tasks independent of the current number of tasks assigned to them. The number of tasks awaiting realization by a single agent cannot exceed the agent's maximal task capacity. Incoming tasks are randomly distributed among different agents. Finally, but optionally, we allow unloyal agents to convert to loyal ones. This step may be realized either as soon as an unloyal agent shifts out all of the tasks assigned to him/her or when an unloyal agent has no more than some threshold value of tasks.
The CA technique has been chosen to implement the model described above. A CA 7,22-24 consists of a regular grid of cells, each in one of a finite number of states. At each time step, a new generation of the cells' states is created, according to some fixed rule that determines the new state of each cell in terms of the current state of the cell and the states of the cells in its neighborhood. Here, von Neumann neighborhood on L 3 L square bi-layer lattice with lateral periodic boundary conditions is assumed, i.e. the site (i, j) have exactly z = 4 neighbors at sites (i61, j), (i, j61). The first lattice layer indicates agents strategy (loyal X (i, j) = 0 or unloyal X (i, j) = 1). The second layer carries information on current number of tasks k(i, j) = 0, . . . , M assigned to the (i, j)th agent. We start the simulation with L 2 loyal agents awaiting for their first tasks, i.e.
The automata rule is as follows.
1. K different sites (i, j) are selected randomly. The number of tasks assigned to agents occupying these sites is incremented by Z:
2. Each loyal agent (X t + 1=6 (i, j) = 0) with more than R tasks assigned to him/her (k t + 1=6 (i, j) . R) changes his/her strategy to an unloyal one:
3. Each loyal agent (X t + 2=6 (i, j) = 0) realizes one of his/her tasks:
4. Each unloyal agent (X t + 3=6 (i, j) = 1) with more than T [and (z À 1) 4 T 4 R] tasks assigned to him/her (k t + 3=6 (i, j) . T ) redistributes his/her own tasks among his/her (z = 4) nearest neighbors
and
5. The number of tasks scheduled to a single agent cannot exceed the maximal agent's capacity M:
6. The conversion of unloyal agent (X t + 5=6 (i, j) = 1) to loyal member of the group is possible
(A) after shifting out all of his/her tasks (k t + 5=6 (i, j) = 0); (B) alternatively, we allow for unloyal agents' relaxation to loyal ones when they have no more than T tasks (k t + 5=6 (i, j) 4 T).
Steps 6(A) or 6(B) are realized only optionally. We will show that realization of these steps is crucial for avoiding the 'black scenario' of the working group total 'jamming'.
If steps 6(A) and 6(B) are omitted, then simply
The steps described above are consecutively and synchronously applied to all sites. The results for applying steps 1-5, 1-5 + 6(A) and 1-5 
Model verification
The model verification for computer models means the model evaluation or 'process of reaching to sufficient confidence that the model is ready for use in particular case'. 27 In order to verify 4 our model we inspect the single-agent temporal evolution of: Figure  1 ) and the number of tasks assigned to a single agent cannot exceed assumed maximal number M = 16 (k 2 f0, 1, . . . , M À 1, Mg, panels C in Figure 1 ). For an irreversible transition to the unloyal strategy only a single transition of state X t = 0 ! X t + 1 = 1 is expected, as presented in panels B in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) . On the contrary, for rule 6(A), multiple transitions X t = 0 ! X t + 1 = 1 and X t = 1 ! X t + 1 = 0 may be observed (panels B in Figures 1(c) and 1(d) ).
Results

Irreversible transition to the unloyal state
In Figure 2 the time evolution of spatial distribution of unloyal agents is presented. The back-conversions of unloyal agents to loyal ones are excluded, i.e. we do not realize the optional 6th step from our algorithm presented in Section 2. The periodic boundary conditions are assumed. After t . 20 unloyal agents appear more likely at the border of existing unloyal agents' cluster.
The time evolution of the average fraction of unloyal agents ½hri (percent) and the average number of tasks per agent ½hki are presented in Figure 3 . Here, hÁ Á Ái denotes a spatial average over all L 2 agents and [.] stands for an average over N different simulations. Obviously, increasing number of sites K where new tasks are delivered must lead to decreasing time (t o ) after which all agents become unloyal and to decreasing time (t t ) after which all agents have to complete maximally allowed number M of tasks. These times (t o , t t ) dependencies on number K of agents chosen for new Z tasks realization are presented in Figure 4 .
Please note, that after time t . t t the newly incoming tasks are lost, as all both unloyal and overburdened agents ignore them. This situation is caused by the assumed numerical technique (CA), in which single lattice cell may stay in a finite number of states (here two, for the first automaton layer, and M for the second one). This however, does not influence our results qualitatively, as increasing of maximal agents capacity M results only in a delay in reaching overburden state of all agents (see Figure 5 (a)); the time of conversion all agents to unloyal group members (t t ) remains unchanged. Time t t grows with M roughly linearly (see Figure 5(b) ).
This transition can be verified by a comparison with a simplified picture, obtained with a mean field model of a square lattice of agents. The equation is composed in the spirit of Tang and Bak 25 and Bagnoli et al., 26 where the set of states is reduced to unloyal (with probability r) and loyal (with probability 1 À r):
where the terms on the right-hand side of Equation (7) for i = 0 are related to a creation/anihilation of unloyal agent in the neighborhood of four unloyal/loyal ones, the terms for i = 1 describe a creation/anihilation of unloyal agent in the neighborhood of three unloyal/loyal ones, etc. The last term (field h . 0) is a creation of unloyal agent because of an external flow of tasks. 25 For h = 0 we get three fixed points: r Ã 0 = 1, r Ã 1 = 0 (both stable) and r Ã 2 = 1 2 (unstable). When h increases to h b ' 0:06493966 . . ., the roots r Ã 1 and r Ã 2 merge at the saddle-node bifurcation (see Figure 6 ) and the unloyal state r Ã 0 = 1 remains as the only solution. The same situation appears for the chain of agents and for the Bethe lattice with three neighbors, but with h b = 1 8 . Decrease of h b with increasing lattice coordination number seems to be natural, as for larger number of neighbors the transition to the unloyal state should appear earlier. Although many details are lost in this description, the basic result, the destabilization of the loyal state with an increasing input of tasks, is reproduced.
Hysteretic rules
When back-conversion of unloyal agents to loyal ones is excluded, it is just a matter of time when the system will be totally overburdened. Without agents relaxation to loyalty (X = 0) the system inescapably tends to the situation where all agents are unloyal and always have to complete yet M tasks. In order to avoid this 'black scenario' unloyal agents must have a chance for relaxation to the state of loyalty. However, even when back-conversion is allowed for some set of parameters, system 'jamming' may occur.
When unloyal agents are allowed to relax to the state of loyalty, the ultimate system fate depends on assumed values of parameters K, T, R and Z. The phase space of parameters K, T , R, Z may be divided into two regions, for which the system either tends to the 'jamming' state
or the average number of task awaiting for realization and the average fraction of unloyal agents do not reach their maximal values
In terms of statistical physics we can talk about 'organizational' phase transition between the 'jamming' and 'making-it' phases. The efficiency of task realization in the 'making-it' phase depends quantitatively on the applied relaxation rule (6(A) or 6(B)). The results of simulations for these two rules will be presented in the subsequent two subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively.
4.2.1
Returning to loyalty after completing all tasks (k = 0). The time evolution of the average fraction ½hri of unloyal agents and the average number ½hki of tasks per agent are presented in Figures 7 and 8 , respectively. The results were obtained with rule 6(A) applied in simulation, i.e. when relaxation to loyalty is possible for an agent who shifted out all of the tasks assigned to her/him. The fraction of unloyal agents varies between 14% \ ½hri \ 18% for Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 in the 'making-it' phase (K 4 7) (see Figure 7 (a)). For K . 7 the system reaches a 'jamming' phase. Using again statistical physics terminology, we can The same critical values of K C , T C , R C and Z C on the above-mentioned hyper-planes may be observed in only in this 'jammed' phase. For the set of model control parameters corresponding to the 'making-it' phase, the changes in the parameter M do not influence the results of simulations (until M is larger than thresholds R and T).
4.2.2
Relaxation to loyal strategy for a sufficiently low number of awaiting tasks (k 4 T ). When the change in agents' strategies from an unloyal to a loyal one occurs as soon as they have less than T tasks, the qualitative picture remains the same, i.e. we observe two regimes in tasks realization in our model working group. The results presented in Figures 9 and 10 correspond to step 6(B) instead of 6(A) in our algorithm. The time evolution of the average fraction ½hri of unloyal working group members and the average number ½hki of tasks per agent are presented in Figures 9 and 10 , respectively. The only qualitative difference appears in system response to changing R and T parameters: 'jamming' phase occurs for small enough values of R \ R C and large values of T . T C when rule 6(A) is applied, and it is absent for rule 6(B). The common difference between results of applying rule 6(A) or 6(B) is the average level of loyalty/unloyalty in the working group and the average number of tasks awaiting realization. Selecting for inspection the same hyper-planes as in Section 4.2.1 we see definitely lower ranges of ½hri and ½hki in the 'making-it' phase. These differences are presented in Table 1 . Also the change of critical parameters K C , T C , R C and Z C may be easily observed (see Table 2 ).
Discussion and conclusions
In our model working group, the crucial point for avoiding system 'jamming' is allowing agents to relax to loyalty. In the case of applying hysteretic rules (6(A) or 6(B)), the 'black scenario' of the system stacking in a 'jammed' phase may be avoided when: the number of agents chosen for task realization K; the number of assigned tasks Z; the threshold value R of assigned tasks, which force the agent to conversion from loyalty to unloyalty; or the threshold value T of tasks assigned to unloyal agent, which force him/her to tasks redistribution among his/her neighbors; are smartly chosen. The term 'smartly chosen' means:
small enough for K, T, Z parameters and large enough for the parameter R when rule 6(A) is applied; small enough for K and Z parameters for rule 6(B).
Basically, the influence of the model parameters on the results of the simulations reflects what can be expected. Yet, several results deserve more attention.
The first is related to the role of parameter T, which is the threshold; if a unloyal agent has more than T tasks, he/ she shifts his tasks to his/her neighbors. When rule 6(B) is applied, the larger the value of T, the earlier unloyal agents return to loyalty, which should result in smoother tasks realization; then it seems that the collective transition to the unloyalty phase should be less likely when T increases. Yet, the numerical results presented in Figure  10 (b) indicate that the trend is slightly opposite. On the other hand, we well understand this trend for rule 6(A) (see Figures 7(b) and 8(b) ). The point is that an unloyal agent does not perform her/his tasks even if their number is less than T. In this super-selfish state, the agent neither does his/her tasks nor sends them to his/her neighbors. The agent is just waiting until he/she again has at least T tasks and after receiving them above the threshold T he/ she redistributes them among his/her neighbors. Please note, however, once tasks are shifted, there is a chance that some of them will be performed if a neighbor is still a loyal agent. This hypothesis may be particularly attractive if we recall clustering of unloyal agents presented in Figure 2 . The tasks shifted by unloyal agents may leave the cluster of unloyal agents as soon as they reach its border.
The second issue is more complex: some numerical results seem to be stable, i.e. they remain constant in a certain range of at least some parameters. An example is the percentage of unloyal agents, shown in Figure 7(a) , as dependent on the parameter K. Recalling that K is a measure of the number of incoming tasks, we should expect that the number of unloyal agents increases monotonously with K. More exactly, the stream of incoming tasks is the product K Á Z, where Z is the number of incoming tasks assigned to an agent. We could expect that the number of unloyal agents should be a function of this product. Instead, what we observe is that the number of unloyal agents increases with Z but remains stable with K, as shown in Figure 7 (a) This puzzle remains to be solved. A plausible hypothesis is that some number of unloyal agents is functional, as they help to transport tasks throughout the system, making the spatial distribution of tasks more homogeneous. Four tasks can be performed by four loyal neighbors in one time step, not in four steps. Within the range of parameters where the stability is observed, the problem of overload is perhaps solved locally. Yet, this hypothesis waits for a confirmation with dedicated numerical tools, such as the local correlation functions of the task density.
The third issue is connected with ambiguous role of parameter R. It seems reasonable to expect the scenario presented in Figures 7(d) and 8(c), i.e. when increasing of the threshold value R after which loyal agents become unloyal group members helps the system to remain in the 'making-it' phase. However, this natural system response to increasing R is absent when rule 6(B) is applied. Yet, for the variant 6(B), the overall amount of unloyal agents is much smaller. Perhaps a weak increase of ½hri and ½hki with R is related to a longer lifetime of an unloyal agent, who has to shift more tasks (R À T ) to be converted to a loyal agent again. Anyway, this increase seems to be a second-order effect. On the other hand for this rule when scanning R parameter we do not observe a 'jammed' phase on the (Z = 4, T = 3, K = 7) hyper-plane (see Figures 9(c) and 10(c) and Table 2 ).
From the perspective of social simulation, the model and results reported above fall into the category of YAWOTAS ('yet another way of thinking about stuff'), i.e. of analogical models rather than explanatory or predictive ones. 28 Yet, this category is shared with most applications based on the technique of CA. According to classic textbooks on social sciences, 29 our research can be classified as an exploration; here it deals with mathematical aspects of performance of groups of workers. Our results suggest that the regime where their work is efficient can be stabilized by a tuning of the system parameters. Also we hope that the memory effect captured by hysteretic rules can be inspiring when looking for solutions to other problems, even so elusive as those met in social sciences. Yet we should add that our mechanism of switching to the unloyal state by passing duties from a neighbor is more specific than social contagion in general. Therefore, here we do not need to discuss the conditions of an efficient social contagion, formulated in the literature. 30, 31 The model setting and the results can be treated as a social realization of the concept of self-organized criticality. 32, 33 When applied to a large system, these frames suggest research on the number of 'topplings', i.e. events when a given task is passed along a chain of coworkers. In our model, tasks are irreversible and it is only their number which matters. Yet, the unloyal strategy, when applied by the majority of agents, is equivalent to the self-organized critical state, when no task is performed; they are only passed from one agent to another. We note that with rule 6(A), this collectively unloyal state is absorbing, analogously to the very idea of self-organization. On the other hand, the scale-free distribution of the length of the above remarked chains has been discussed by Barabási 34 as a result of putting tasks with lower priority off. These analogies promisingly link the theory of organizations to current problems of statistical mechanics.
